1125: Haiti Progres, Dignity & L'Union talk about LIC in Haiti (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: MKarshan@aol.com

This article, which appeared in two parts in Haiti Progres in January 2002 in
English, and more recently as a Haiti Progres centerfold in French, also
appears in an edited form in Creole on the front page of the Aristide
Foundation for Democracy's newspaper, Dignity, and yesterday appeared, also
in an edited form, in French, on the front page of the Haitian Government's
daily newspaper L'Union:
===========================================================
Haiti Progres

Low-Intensity Warfare in Haiti
An Interview with Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer
by Mara Delt **** Parts One and Two

Direct military assault is only one of several means which the U.S. employs
to impose its will on nations throughout the Third World. Political
destabilization, media demonization, proxy guerrilla harassment, diplomatic
machinations, and economic sanctions are also weapons in Washington's
arsenal. These are the tools of "low-intensity warfare," a topic on which
Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer is an expert. An assistant professor of Justice and
Peace Studies at the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota, Nelson-Pallmeyer
is the author of numerous articles and books on U.S. foreign policy including
"War Against the Poor: Low Intensity Conflict and Christian Faith" (Orbis
Books 1991); "Brave New World Order" (Orbis Books 1992); and "School of the
Assassins: The Case for Closing the School of the Americas" (Orbis Books
1997).

Haïti Progrès contributor Mara Delt interviewed Nelson-Pallmeyer on Dec. 14,
just before the Dec. 17 attack on the National Palace, which can be
categorized as just one more battle in the low-intensity war against the
Haitian people.

* * * * * * * *

Mara Delt: What is low-intensity conflict?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: Low-intensity conflict is a U.S. military strategy for
intervention in non-traditional settings. It's primarily directed toward
countries in the so-called Third World or Two-Thirds World. It's a type of
warfare that implies, or involves, not direct combat between soldiers, not a
high technology warfare as you see in the bombing of Afghanistan or Iraq....
It's implemented through diplomatic channels, through economic leverage
through institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank.
It's basically designed to achieve objectives that are similar to war. You
want a country to capitulate. You want a country to do what you want them to
do, but you fight the war through non-traditional channels.

Mara Delt: Does it follow a pattern or stages?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: There are typical things that you find in the package. This
warfare strategy really emerged after the U.S. suffered a defeat in
Indochina, and it was thoroughly tested in Central America in the 1980s.
There you saw, for example, diplomatic aspects of warfare when the U.S. tried
to isolate the country of Nicaragua. You saw the U.S. using diplomatic
leverage on neighboring countries like Honduras to become a base of support
for the Nicaraguan "Contras." There were economic aspects of the war, a kind
of embargo against Nicaragua that prevented trade. There were economic,
diplomatic efforts to try to isolate Nicaragua by getting their allies not to
trade or provide aid. This also involved the use of debt as a kind of weapon.
They used the indebtedness of neighboring countries, like Honduras for
example, as leverage to get them to open up their country to be a base for
their destabilization campaign against Nicaragua.

At the same time they used the warfare against the Nicaraguan people to avert
that country's capacity to put its economic resources towards development;
resources were instead put into defense against the warfare. All those are
aspects.

Another important aspect in Central America was psychological warfare, and
that takes different forms as well. Sometimes psychological warfare can mean
funding terrorism. The U.S., for example, created a CIA manual for the
"Contras" in Nicaragua on how to maximize the psychological impact of
terrorizing civilians. So it can take that form.

In the case of Haiti, what you see is just an attempt to wear down the
population by holding up key economic aid, trying to create disenchantment
with the government whose inclination is to try to meet the needs of the
people. All those are standard practices. But in more recent cases the U.S.
has preferred to intervene through its economic leverage, trying to shape
countries' economic policies in ways that the U.S. prefers, but which often
has a very negative impact on people on the ground.

Mara Delt: When you talk about capitulating to their goals, what is the U.S.
objective then in the end?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: The U.S. objective is simply to control the economic
decisions of a country. I argue in my writings that the preferred instrument
of U.S. foreign policy from about 1945 to 1980 was military dictatorships. I
would say that between 1980 and 1990 there were two tracks in U.S. policy.
One was actually increasing support for repressive governments in Central
America and elsewhere. But at the same time, you had a movement in the
direction of utilizing debt as leverage, and, for the International Monetary
Fund, structural adjustment programs became more important in the 1980s.
Today, the U.S. prefers to exercise its power through economic channels. It
wants a favorable investment economy. It wants to make sure that unions
aren't strong. It wants to make sure that a country is not diverting its
resources to the needs of its people, resources that are necessary for paying
debt and doing other things. So what the U.S. wants is control, economic
control, and it will use whatever leverage it has.

I would say, from my understanding of what's happening in Haiti, that the
other thing the U.S. doesn't want is a progressive government in power. It
wants a government more valuable to its own interests and power. Holding back
the [$146 million] Inter-American Development Bank loan (see Haïti Progrès,
Vol. 19, No. 37, 11/28/01) is a way of trying to force a change of
government. The U.S. doesn't want authentic democracy. It wants democracy
within various narrow channels that it dictates in terms of what economic
choices are available to countries and peoples.

Mara Delt: People often ask what is the U.S. interest in Haiti. Why do they
care about Haiti, what does Haiti have?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: That's a really good question. The same question was asked
about Nicaragua and El Salvador. What's the big issue? El Salvador didn't
have that many resources, Nicaragua didn't have a whole lot, and Haiti
doesn't have a lot. But I think the U.S. really fears independent democracy
because independent democracies are what the world desperately needs. By that
I mean democracies that can really function, in which governments have the
power to shape the economic decisions of their countries, to try to reorient
their economic priorities to meet the basic needs of their people. In Haiti
that doesn't cost the U.S. a lot. Whatever happens in Haiti isn't going to
impact the U.S. a great deal. The same thing could be said about El Salvador,
Cuba, or Nicaragua. But when you take those examples together and then you
spread that model elsewhere and if, for example, Mexico had an authentic
democratic government that would reorient resources -- that would be a
challenge.

There's a new mythology that guides the world today -- at least the world as
created by U.S. policymakers -- and that is that globalization is good. What
is not said is that globalization means corporate-led globalization. The
reality is that corporate-led globalization is very good for about 20% of
humanity, and it's very bad for probably half of humanity, and it puts the
rest in very vulnerable positions. You could probably give me statistics on
Haiti, but worldwide, about 3 billion people are living and dying on less
than $2 a day. According to the UN, the three richest people in the world
have assets greater than the gross domestic products of the 48 poorest
countries combined. In that kind of world, any government which is really
independent and which is going to try to redirect economic resources to meet
the needs of the majority will be treated by the U.S. as an enemy because if
that example were to spread to countries throughout the world (which in my
view has to happen if we're going to respond to the issues of poverty), then
that does become a problem for the U.S., for U.S. economic interests.

Mara Delt: The opposition in Haiti refuses to accept the results of recent
elections and has since been working to create instability in the country. Is
that a technique that the U.S. typically uses in all the countries?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: Absolutely. You saw the exact same pattern in Nicaragua,
for example. The U.S. first worked to destabilize the Sandinista-led
government in Nicaragua and then poured millions of dollars into
consolidating a right-wing coalition with a centrist face, and then
communicated to the electorate -- through the invasion of Panama and an
ongoing threat of continued warfare -- that if the people didn't vote
properly they could expect ongoing sanctions and possibly a military
invasion.

We don't even have to go back to that earlier history of 1990. We can go back
to the recent elections in Nicaragua where the U.S. ambassador basically said
in newspapers and on television in Nicaragua that, if people voted for
[Sandinista presidential candidate] Daniel Ortega, that would simply be
unacceptable to the US.

Mara Delt: The U.S. ambassador said that publicly?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: Yes, basically. It was that blatant. The U.S. communicated
in no uncertain terms that an electoral victory by Ortega would cause serious
problems with U.S. relations. That, in my view, is a very clear intervention
into the democratic process and that, in a sense, pre-determines an outcome.
If a government had been elected in Nicaragua that the U.S. didn't like, then
you would see a new stage kick in, similar to what Haiti is experiencing now.


So, yes, this has been done and continues to be done, over and over again. In
Haiti now, because Aristide was elected with a pretty overwhelming majority,
I think the U.S. probably is trying to send a very clear message that
Aristide will only be acceptable to the U.S. if he governs outside of his
commitment to improve the living situation of the majority of people in
Haiti.

Mara Delt: The opposition continues to challenge the validity of recent local
elections because Haiti has moved towards decentralization and that's where
the power is, at the base, with the local representation. That's not in the
interest of the opposition, and it's certainly not in the interest of the
U.S..

Nelson-Pallmeyer: From what I can gather in Haiti, part of a classic
low-intensity conflict strategy is that you really try to make the economy
scream. You do that in part because you're trying to erode the base of
popular support for the government that you don't like. So in this case, by
holding up those loans, which would largely go to healthcare and water
development and other things, the U.S. is squeezing the constituency that is
probably most supportive of the Aristide government and the decentralized
process that you just named. The whole purpose of the strategy is to create
instability in the country and to eat away at, to erode, the popular base of
a popular government. That's the purpose of the strategy.

-----------------------

Last week, Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, a scholar who has written several books on
U.S. foreign policy in Central America, outlined some of the key features of
Washington's "low-intensity warfare": engineered elections, economic
strangulation, and political destabilization. He explained how many aspects
of the strategy employed in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1980s are
evident in Haiti today. He was interviewed by our contributor, Mara Delt.

Mara Delt: Looking at Mozambique, where the current U.S. ambassador to Haiti
was stationed prior to Haiti, we see it was the same strategy there as well.
The opposition there [RENAMO] looks just like the one in Haiti. In fact, they
were the "Contras," supported by the old repressive apartheid South African
government, which fought the progressive FRELIMO government. That opposition
challenged the electoral results in Mozambique in an effort to paralyze that
country, and the U.S. froze funds there as well.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: When I laid out the strategy of low-intensity conflict in
my book "War Against the Poor," I talked about how the U.S. had made a
transition away from direct support of dictators because it discovered that
dictatorial rule could be destabilizing to its economic interests. For
example, the dictators in the Philippines and elsewhere were welcome, but
when their dictatorial rule became disruptive, then those dictators had to
go. That transition then led to a commitment to using elections for
undemocratic purposes. That's the way I would describe it. The U.S. would
then utilize the elections as a cover for who really rules.

For example, in this stage of low-intensity conflict in El Salvador, you
would have elections but the elected government really didn't wield much
power. The power was either rooted in the U.S. embassy or the Salvadorian
military or whatever. But the U.S. could say publicly: "See, we support
democracy, they had democratic elections there, that's why we can militarily
back this government." So that's a stage.

I would say it's continued to evolve so that now elections mean almost
nothing. In other words, the political space available to governments is now
determined by structural adjustment programs. It's determined by the power of
the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank and those who stand
behind them. Basically they say to a country: "This is what you have to do
economically." That's all being formalized now through free trade agreements,
the World Trade Organization, and other things.

That puts Haiti in a very unusual situation because Haiti has actually
carried out an election in which there is popular support for a government to
do certain things. And what do the people want that government to do? They
want jobs. They want more money going to education and health care, agrarian
reform, literacy -- the basic priorities that are the same throughout much of
the world.... Haitians have dared to elect a government that has those
priorities. The United States simply doesn't accept those priorities because
the U.S. priorities, the priorities of globalization, are in fact to assure
that you have an ongoing transfer of wealth from the poor to the rich and a
further consolidation of economic power.

What's happening in Haiti with regards to the elections is very logical
within the U.S. strategy. They are trying to discredit the elections
themselves by challenging the mechanism by which the elections took place
and, at the same time, the legitimacy of those who were elected. The U.S. has
created a right-wing coalition that it can claim as an alternative,
legitimate voice. Probably, and most importantly, by withholding funds, the
U.S., as I said earlier, is setting out to destabilize the political base of
this government... This is a problem whenever the government is dependent on
outside aid and, if a progressive government is dependent upon these loans
coming from the Inter-American Development Bank, it gives the U.S. incredible
leverage. Eventually it's trying to create conditions in which there will be
a popular uprising against the popular government because the government will
have failed to deliver on the things that it really wants to do but is
prevented from doing by these international institutions, oftentimes led and
controlled by the United States.

Mara Delt: Do you often see these movements imploding from these stresses?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: That's part of the psychological warfare too. An example I
would give -- and this is closer to home -- is when there is popular protest
in the United States against U.S. foreign policy: for example, the
anti-Vietnam war protests, the very strong solidarity movement with the
people from Central America. The U.S. government often used what we call
agents provocateurs. These agents would infiltrate movements and in many
cases would foment violence within non-violent demonstrations. There's a
great deal of evidence that this is happening on a global scale in response
to the huge anti-globalization movement. You have agents provocateurs moving
into non-violent demonstrations and engaging in violent behavior. Then the
police come in, beat up the non-violent crowd, but they allow those who
engaged in violence to leave.

Mara Delt: Then they attribute that violence to the non-violent group. Then
where do the national and international human rights groups come in?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: This is something that human rights groups have to pay
very, very close attention to, because, of course, the temptation of any
human rights groups is to do a kind of statistical analysis, such as,
"There's this many human rights violations, there's this happening here, this
happening there" and some of that is obviously very valuable.

But, it's very important, in my view, for human rights groups to have a
fairly sophisticated understanding of what's happening on the ground and
why... For example, look at the relationship between the paramilitary groups
in Colombia and the Colombian military. The U.S. supplies the Colombian
military, which in turn directly supplies the Colombian paramilitaries.
Meanwhile, the Colombian military can wash its hands and say, "Look, our
human rights violations are improving" and the U.S. can say, "Look, the
Colombian military's human rights violations are improving." I think some
human rights groups have been fairly sophisticated about seeing that
relationship...

Mara Delt: Otherwise, the human rights groups can further feed into the
opposition and the U.S. destabilization, inadvertently.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: If they're not careful, that can happen. Do you see this
happening in Haiti?

Mara Delt: Yes. What makes it so difficult is that the human rights groups
only document violations made by the government and not by others. So the
story is not balanced. It's not the true picture.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: I would encourage the Haitian government to be very, very
aware that if the United States is engaged -- and I think it is -- in
destabilizing the present government of Haiti, then what it most wants is for
the Haitian government to have to respond to street protests with violence...


Mara Delt: Back to the Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] loan. Presently,
the U.S. has withheld all monies and has influenced the European Union to
withhold its funds as well.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: I think the key issue that needs to be posed is: who is
being hurt by the withholding of these funds and why? Clearly the funds being
withheld are not for a repressive police apparatus, they're not for a Haitian
military. They're funds that are primarily targeted for the economic
infrastructure and just basic health needs of the people. That, in my view,
is a form of terrorism from above.

Mara Delt: That is what President Aristide is calling "economic terrorism."

Nelson-Pallmeyer: I think that's very wise, and that's exactly what it is.
One of the lessons that people need to learn is that warfare is always
deadly. Warfare that is conducted by dropping an unprecedented number of
bombs on people is deadly. But, sanctions are warfare too. Even the
withholding of these kinds of aid is economic warfare, and I think to call it
"economic terrorism" is accurate. It has devastating and very conscious
results, very conscious results. This is clearly the intention of U.S. policy
in Haiti: to harm civilians in service of trying to influence a government.
That's a very clear definition of what terrorism is.

Mara Delt: For the IDB loans, not only is the Haitian government paying
interest on these loans, but they are also paying a user's fee for a loan
they can't use.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: That's got to be illegal!

Mara Delt: Very shortly the Haitian government will owe $10 million to the
IDB and the IDB was set up to help poor countries. So it's crazy, and it's
further depleting the country of any resources that it has. Behind the
scenes, the U.S. ambassador is telling people that he won't see a penny
released to the Haitian government because of alleged corruption. The Haitian
government is saying that they should release these funds and loans because
withholding them is deepening the misery of the people. The Haitian
government even suggested that a reputable accounting firm could monitor the
disbursements of the funds, if that's really a genuine concern. But the US,
of course, is opposing that. Once again, they have reaffirmed their position
two days ago when the State Department said the government is not doing all
the things Aristide promised he would do under the eight points he offered in
a letter to President Clinton. One of the points was the elections. The main
issue on the elections was the method of calculation for seven senators. That
was already resolved months and months ago, but the opposition and the
"international community" keeps raising the bar and changing the terms,
trying to broaden it and enlarge it, and it's just never going to be
fulfilled! Because it's not about a resolution, it's about paralysis.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: Well, that's it. That is classic low-intensity conflict.
For public consumption, you do continue raising the bar and continue putting
demands, because the real purpose isn't to negotiate a settlement. The real
purpose is to destabilize the Haitian government. That's the strategy. That's
what's so maddening. Because the Haitian government may be trying in good
faith to respond to any of the issues that have a shred of credibility to
them, but even as they do that they find that it isn't enough. It's got to be
enormously frustrating for the Haitian government because this is another
classic part of low-intensity conflict: there always will be a raising of the
bar.

Mara Delt: And there will always be another human rights violation occurring
that they're going to cite or build up, or that they are going to create.

Nelson-Pallmeyer: Yes, because the real purpose is destabilization, not
negotiation.

Mara Delt: What about the role of the press? Some just adopt the U.S. State
Department position. But I think the Haitian government has lost the support
of a lot of progressive press along the way because things have become very
confusing. In Nicaragua, when they started discrediting Ortega, did people
just fall by the wayside like that?

Nelson-Pallmeyer: Yes, and I think there were a lot of legitimate problems
with the Sandinistas and Ortega over the last several years, so it made it
easier for that to happen. But the Haitian government is in a difficult
position too because as the policy from the U.S. succeeds in creating more
opposition on the ground and fomenting violence and preventing the delivery
of services, more and more contradictions come into play. So the longer it
plays out, the more contradictions there are and the more difficulty there is
for the Haitian government to respond in viable ways or in creative ways.
This squeeze gets tighter and the contradictions get deeper and it just
starts to spiral, which is the purpose and the goal of the strategy.... I
think that most press behave in ways that are not helpful at all in these
settings.