25602: Dailey: Re 25593 (Comment) (fwd)

[Bob Corbett <corbetre@webster.edu>]

From: Peter Dailey <phdailey@msn.com>

Given the current state of opinion in Washington, you could probably find more 
support for a bill to name Chetchenya the 51st State than you would for a 
measure committing the U.S. to do anything at all regarding Haiti. Last week 
Kofi Annan stressing the need for "boots on the ground" went to Washington DC 
to make a personal appeal to Secretary Rice for U.S. troops to join MINUSTAH 
arguing that even a small number would provide a significant psychological 
boost. They turned him down flat.

Although under Clinton U.S. policy towards Haiti was in a state of flux, and 
was constantly being shaped and reshaped, the approach of the Bush 
administration for the last four years has been remarkably consistent. The 
basic tenet has been that there is nothing happening in Haiti or likely to 
happen in Haiti of sufficient importance to the U.S. to justify becoming 
entangled in what they regard as an undifferentiated Haitian mess and that any 
efforts to do otherwise are likely to be expensive and unsuccessful. This 
policy of not-so-benign neglect was first articulated in a speech by Condoleeza 
Rice to the Council on Foreign Relations several weeks prior to the November, 
2000 election when she stated "we have spent several billion dollars now in 
Haiti and we're going home." Although in December, 2000 during the last days of 
the Clinton administration Anthony Lake made his 25th and last official trip to 
Port-au-Prince to meet with Aristide and obtained his agreement to "8 Points"- 
steps he would take to end the crisis- this was the last significant bilateral 
contact between the U.S. and Haiti for two and a half years. All subsequent 
unsuccessful attempts to negotiate an agreement between Lavalas and the 
opposition were carried out by Ambassador Einaudi and the OAS under the rubric 
of several U.N. resolutions.

A small but significant shift in the U.S. approach occurred near the end of the 
summer of 2003 when Ambassador Terence Todman was brought out of retirement and 
sent to Haiti as Bush's personal representative. I imagine that if Bush and his 
closest advisors- his political people- were aware enough of Aristide to have 
formed an opinion it would have been similar to Jesse Helms's. However, they 
faced a challenge of overriding importance and that was making sure that 
Florida stayed in the red column in 2004. Todman apparently concluded that at 
least in the short term Aristide represented the best chance for stability and 
for avoiding a crisis that would set off a wave of boat people and add a wild 
card to the volatile Florida political mix. This was the Bush administration's 
principal concern, to which the wishes of those who would have liked to kidnap 
Aristide and put him on trial for narcotics trafficking, etc. would have to be 
subordinated.

I have no idea if an informal understanding was ever reached or what signals 
might have been sent, but to posit a de facto understanding at least explains 
several things that happened subsequently and that those who believe that 
Aristide's February ouster was the result of a deliberate and premeditated U.S. 
plan of longstanding  really can't account for.

Here are some of them:

With no advance warning and very little explanation, the U.S. announces that it 
will no longer block the disbursement of the international loans.

At his valedictory speech, outgoing Ambassador Curran blasts what he calls the 
"chimeres of Washington," by which he is understood to mean Stanley Lucas and 
the IRI, for seeking to undermine and subvert Bush administration policy toward 
Haiti.

There are notable instances of cooperation between Aristide and the DEA, like 
the arrest and extradition of Ketant, and between Aristide and the U.S. 
coastguard over intercepting boat people. (On February 28 & 29, the Haitian 
coastguard station involved in these efforts is attacked by chimeres.) 
Aristide, who heretofore has blasted the unnamed parties responsible for 
blocking the loans as "economic terrorists" finds a new target for an 
unprecedented campaign of demagoguery- the 1826 (?) indemnification agreement 
with France. While Lavalas legal hacks put aside their research on Navassa and 
rack up the billable hours on looking for an enforceable basis for Haiti's 
claim- it turns out not surprisingly that there isn't one- Haiti is launched on 
an anti-French campaign rivalling in virulence the one being carried out in 
Washington, and the Haitian people are bombarded by radio commercials the basic 
message of which is: "Your check is in the mail."

On February 13, Haiti reaches the tipping point. A small force, more or less 
identical in leadership and size to one that briefly occupied the National 
Palace on December 17, 2001 and was put to rout in a matter of hours takes over 
police stations in Hinche and Mirebelais. During the 1980s the U.S. armed, 
financed, trained etc. anti-government forces in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola 
and elsewhere and there is nothing inherently outlandish about the idea that 
they would do so again here. However, in these instances the Contras, Jonas 
Savimbi etc. were hailed as freedom fighters, invited to Washington, given 
medals, and their opponents correspondingly denigrated. If that was what was 
taking place in Haiti, why would Colin Powell do everything he could to 
discredit them repeatedly calling them thugs and murderers and pledging that 
the U.S. would not allow them to shoot their way into power?

Here is what Rumsfeld had to say on February 13, 2004: It is always sad to see 
countries struggling, trying to find their way, trying to sort through 
difficulties. [sigh!] It is something that I am hopeful that the countries of 
the region and the international organizations in the region or hemisphere and 
the world will interest themselves in and that they will be able to navigate 
through what is obviously difficult times for them. It seems to ebb and flow 
and at the moment it is not deteriorating that I have seen in recent days."

I have looked at this statement many times since, and it seems even more 
sinister than it did originally. The Haitians are killing each other again- it 
is so sad! No suggestion of even the remotest curiosity about the context, 
speculation about the reasons, or value judgments. He has discerned something 
fundamental about Haitian history that I for one had never realized, that 
political violence ebbs and flows like the tides, and presumably like the tides 
obeys only the moon. Rumsfeld is not aware of any deterioration. [In fact, the 
situation had deteriorated quite dramatically over the last four days ias 
Haitians struggled to find their way in Gonaives, St. Marc, the Central Plateau 
and elsewhere.] These are certainly difficult times for Haiti with the Haitians 
killing each other. Wouldn't it be nice if someone else- a country or 
organization- would take an interest.

On February 16, in response to another question, Rumsfeld commented "Needless 
to say, everyone is hopeful that the situation, which tends to ebb and flow 
down there, will stay below a certain threshold, and that there's -- we have no 
plans to do anything."

So the relevant question in July, 2005 is: "Given the way the violence ebbs and 
flows down there, what is the threshold beyond which the U.S. will feel an 
obligation to act? How many Haitian deaths is too many?"

Peter Dailey