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28716: Leiderman: Europe: "What Haiti needs..." (fwd)

From: leiderman@mindspring.com

dear Readers:

European delegates to the Haiti donors' conference tomorrow have submitted this critique and analysis in advance of the event.  the acronym ICF refers to the 2004 international effort to bring Haiti out of its post-coup shock.  I urge your close reading of this well-written document and your direct responses to the delegates named below.

other advance submissions may also be posted somewhere, but I cannot find a coordinated site.  tant pis.

thank you,

Stuart Leiderman

- - - - - - -

AlterPresse, Reseau alternatif haitien d'information  www.alterpresse.org

          Haiti Interim Cooperation Framework: what needs to change on 25 July 2006

          21 July 2006

          Lack of contribution in economic recovery (particularly in agriculture) and in
          civil society participation from 2004 to 2006 is a fundamental point noted by the
          Europe-Haiti Coordination (Coordination Europe-Haiti - CoE-H), that presented
          an analysis of progress and shortcomings in Haiti Interim Cooperation

          By the Coordination Europe-Haiti - CoE-H

          Received by AlterPresse on July 20, 2006


          Louis Michel, European Commissioner for Development Cooperation and
          Humanitarian Aid

          Stefano Manservi, General Director, DG Development, European Commission

          John Caloghirou, Head of Unity, DG Development

          Lut Fabert-Goossens, DG Development

          Bruno Montariol, EU Delegation, Haiti

          18 July 2006

          Dear Sirs,

          In advance of the international donor conference on Haiti in Port-au-Prince on 25 July, I
          attach a brief analysis of the progress and shortcomings of the Interim Cooperation
          Framework (ICF) for Haiti from the perspective of Coordination Europe-Haiti (CoE-H -
          a network of European NGOs) and our Haitian partner organisations.

          Our paper focuses on two aspects of the ICF which particularly concern us:

          · The ICF's serious shortcomings with regard to economic recovery, particularly
          in agriculture. We refer to figures compiled by the Cellule du Coordination Strategique
          of the Haitian Prime Minister's office in May 2006 which indicate that the agricultural
          sector has received 74% less funding than the original ICF plans had identified this
          sector would need. Rapid job creation received 87% less than identified in 2004.

          Aside from quantity, our paper also questions the quality of ICF assistance. We assert
          that the ICF is a very piecemeal attempt at agricultural regeneration which has failed to
          address the twin issues of developing competitive agricultural supply chains and
          reducing Haiti's huge dependence on food imports (accounting for 80% of its export
          earnings). We call on donors and the Haitian government to:

              -- make economic recovery the area of focus for future donor engagement

              -- formulate and invest in a coherent, sustainable agricultural development policy which
          reduces Haiti's food imports, targets particular agricultural supply chains, and invests
          more in addressing Haiti?s severe environmental degradation.

          · The lack of civil society participation in the ICF, from its inception through to
          implementation, monitoring and evaluation over the past two years. The poorest and
          most marginalized sectors of Haitian civil society - those who are supposed to benefit
          most from the ICF - have been completely absent from any consultation processes. We
          call on donors and the Haitian government to:

              -- Carry out a participatory evaluation of the ICF

              -- Create mechanisms for civil society engagement in the joint steering committee for
          implementation and follow-up of the ICF (COCCI)

              -- Open up the dialogue between donors and the Haitian government to public scrutiny
          and disseminate information to Haitian civil society about the progress and
          implementation of the ICF.

          Please do not hesitate to contact CoE-H if you have any queries relating to the attached
          paper. Your enquiries can be directed to myself or to: Alessandra Spalletta,
          Coordinator of CoE-H, Rue des Tanneurs 165, B 1000 Bruxelles, Tel: +32 2 213 04 18
          Mob: +32 (0)486 647 612; a.spalletta@broederlijkdelen.be

          We thank you in advance for the attention paid to our important proposals.

          Yours sincerely

          Helen Collinson Policy Officer, Latin America and the Caribbean Christian Aid (UK) Tel
          +44 1404 814078; mob: +44 (0)790 394 7782 helen@hcollinson90.freeserve.co.uk

          On behalf of: Coordination Europe-Haiti (CoE-H),


          Annabelle Hagon, DG AIDCO, European Commission

          Jose Soler, DG AIDCO

          Claude Mainge, DG AIDCO

          Remo Vahl, DG Trade

          Valerie Liang-Champrenault, French representation

          Berbardo Desicart, Spanish representation

          Antonio Bullon, Spanish representation

          Markus Knauf, German representation

          Rudolf Gridl, German representation

          Simon Wells, British representation

          Steve Williams, British representation

          I Morgantini MEP,

          Johann van Hecke MEP

          Glyn Ford MEP

          Glenys Kinnock MEP

          Fiona Hall, MEP

          Richard Howitt MEP

          P Schapira MEP

          P Verges MEP

          J Trauffler MEP

          B Melis, MEP

          Coordination Europe-Haiti (CoE-H) is a network of European solidarity and
          non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working directly with Haitian partner NGOs
          and grassroots movements. COE-H incorporates 60 organisations in 8 European
          countries: Belgium, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Spain and
          Switzerland. CoE-H works closely with Coordination Haiti-Europe (CoH-E) in Haiti,
          formed by Haitian NGOs to engage with European NGOs and the EU.

- - - - - - -

          Interim Cooperation Framework: what needs to change

          In advance of the forthcoming international donor conference in Port-au-Prince on 25
          July 2006, the Europe-Haiti Coordination (Coordination Europe-Haiti - CoE-H) (1)
          presents to donors a brief analysis of the progress and shortcomings of the Interim
          Cooperation Framework (ICF) through which donors have been contributing funds to
          Haiti since 2004.

          Below, we have analysed not just the original plans and intentions of the ICF, but also
          the implementation of these plans over the past two years.

          The ICF covers a range of development activities intended to address Haiti?s extreme
          poverty and promote stability and security for its citizens after years of violence and
          political turmoil. Donors developing the ICF in 2004 came up with four strategic axes for
          intervention over a transitional period (the ICF has now been extended to the end of
          2007). These were:

          · Strengthening political governance and promoting national dialogue · Strengthening
          economic governance and contributing to institutional development · Promoting
          economic recovery · Improving access to basic services

          This paper does not attempt to analyse progress in all of the above four axes. Instead, it
          focuses on two elements of the ICF where poor performance is of particular cause for
          concern to CoE-H and its Haitian partner organisations:

          · The ICF's serious shortcomings with regard to economic recovery, particularly
          in relation to agriculture

          · The lack of civil society participation in the ICF, from its inception through to
          implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

          This is not to suggest that other elements of the ICF are not equally important. We
          recognise, for example, that police and judicial reform and human rights protection are
          also crucial. Likewise access to basic services is key to poverty reduction in Haiti,
          including access to education on which Haiti?s future depends. Moreover, by focusing
          on the need for investment in agriculture and rural development, we do not deny that
          there are serious problems of urban deprivation that also need to be addressed
          urgently, not least in order to reduce the potential for violence. Nor do we wish to
          suggest that the ICF's shortcomings are confined solely to economic recovery and to
          the lack of civil society participation.

          We trust that greater transparency and participation in the formulation and
          implementation of national development plans in the future will enable Haitian civil
          society organisations and European NGOs alike to contribute their diverse experience
          and expertise to the whole range of sectors and issues.

          I Haitian Economic Recovery and the Interim Cooperation Framework

          The re-engagement of international donors in Haiti since 2004, under the Interim
          Cooperation Framework (ICF), comes at a critical time and with enormous challenges
          for its economic recovery. Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere.
          According to recent poverty studies conducted in the country, an estimated 76 per cent
          of its 8.4 million population lives below the poverty line (on less than US$2 a day) while
          approximately 56 per cent lives in abject poverty (on less than US$1 a day). Rural areas
          are the worst affected with close to four fifths of Haiti?s extremely poor living outside the

          The Interim Cooperation Framework - original plans for economic recovery

          Agriculture is one element identified as key within the ICF's â??economic recovery'
          axis. This axis also includes macroeconomic stability, electricity, rapid job creation and
          microfinance, private sector development, roads and transportation and environmental
          protection and rehabilitation. Each of these has its own funding line and targets.

          Alongside agricultural development and support for small and medium-size enterprises,
          the ICF states that the economic recovery programme will encourage the development
          of the tourism sector and free trade zones. At the time that the ICF was drawn up in
          2004, a number of Haitian civil society organisations and international NGOs raised
          serious concerns about the focus on tourism and free trade zones. Their concerns
          stemmed from the fact that earlier attempts to develop these sectors had brought few
          benefits to Haiti's poor.

          Free trade zones. The number of jobs created in Haiti's free trade zones has so far
          failed to impress and overall employment in the sector has been in decline since trade
          liberalization (around 30,000 jobs today compared to 60,000 in 1980). The quality of
          these jobs is also poor. The Ministry of Economy and Finance describes it as the sector
          with the least value added and the lowest annual wage, compared with other industries
          in the country.

          Tourism. Haiti's deficient infrastructure means that any strategy to address tourism is
          unlikely to be pro-poor. It will rely on significant amounts of foreign investment but
          provide a small number of poorly paid, low-skilled jobs, while profits will be transferred
          out of the country and the sector will rely to a large extent on imported inputs, with few
          links to the local economy.

          Agriculture. Given the extremes of rural poverty, it is essential to address agricultural
          development. In Haiti seventy per cent of the population depends directly or indirectly on
          agriculture, mostly small-scale farming. The agricultural sector has suffered a dramatic
          decline in the last two decades. National production has fallen (both production for
          exports and the local market) and there has been a huge increase in food imports.
          While Haitian agriculture has traditionally suffered from many constraints (small size of
          landholdings, deforestation, lack of irrigation, storage, transport etc), there is no doubt
          that the recent trend of declining national production is also linked to trade liberalization.
          Haiti is one of the most open economies in the world and now spends 80% of its export
          earnings importing food.

          In spite of this critical situation, there is little evidence of donors taking a strategic
          approach to agricultural regeneration, even though it was identified as a priority sector
          within the ICF's economy recovery axis. Indeed, the approach to agriculture seems to
          epitomise the general lack of coherence in donor plans for Haiti. The focus is on
          punctual activities rather than improving the overall competitiveness of agricultural
          supply chains in Haiti. This is at odds with donor approaches to agricultural
          development in other countries, where it is standard practice to target particular supply
          chains, addressing key issues such as production, finance, distribution and marketing
          holistically for a given supply chain.

          Within the ICF's Economy Recovery axis, the main activities planned for agricultural
          development include:

          · vaccination of livestock and disease control

          · rehabilitation of rural roads, canals and irrigation pumps

          · distribution of seeds and tool kits

          · support for fruit farming and intensification of small livestock activities

          · support for marketing and processing activities

          · strengthening the capacity of the Ministry for Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural
          Development (MARNDR)

          In addition, the ICF's agriculture plan fails to address the key issue of how competitive
          agricultural supply chains can be set up in Haiti when its economy is so open to imports.
          Given the fact that Haiti spends over 80 per cent of its export earnings on importing
          food, it is highly advisable - purely from a balance of payments perspective - that the
          Haitian government pursue a strategy to reduce food imports and replace them with
          national production. Addressing the competitiveness of supply chains of agricultural
          products sold in local markets is therefore critical and needs to be done in conjunction
          with a review of trade policy. However, this key issue is ignored in the ICF.

          One major factor behind Haiti's agricultural crisis is its extreme environmental
          degradation resulting from deforestation, soil erosion and unsustainable agricultural
          practices over many years, as the original ICF document acknowledged. Environmental
          degradation is also a key reason for Haiti?s particular vulnerability to floods and
          landslides. And yet less than 2% of ICF funds were pledged for environmental
          protection and rehabilitation in the budget drawn up in 2004.

          Evaluating the progress of the ICF

          In February 2006, donors meeting in Washington to discuss the ICF agreed that both an
          audit and an independent evaluation of the ICF should be conducted over subsequent
          months. To date, we have been unable to establish whether either the audit or the
          independent evaluation has been undertaken. Nor do we know what evaluations will
          inform the forthcoming ICF donor pledging conference on 25 July 2006.

          Nevertheless, since 2004, several evaluations have been conducted of the ICF and
          various reports have been made publicly available.

          In agriculture, these progress reports include the following achievements:

          · small infrastructure projects undertaken - irrigation systems, rural roads, water
          conservation etc.

          · support provided to fruit growers and livestock farmers

          · distribution of 15 tons of seeds

          · distribution and planting of 3.9 million plants (mangoes, papaya, bamboo)

          · 3,500 farmers provided with seeds and tools after tropical storm Jeanne in September

          · local development plan completed for one commune

          · 5 contracts signed to undertake civil works to strengthen the operations of the South
          Artibonite canal

          · vaccination of livestock and disease control

          · training of staff in the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural
          Development (MARNDR).

          Such results reinforce the view that the ICF is a very piecemeal attempt at agricultural
          regeneration. These activities are unlikely to lead to the development of the productive
          potential of small farmers to allow them to compete on local and export markets.

          It is also notable that the strengthening of MARNDR has received very little attention in
          practice, even though this was highlighted as a priority in the original ICF plans for the
          agricultural sector.

          Actual spending on economic recovery compared to original plans

          An analysis of the financial information relating to spending on economic recovery,
          including agriculture, indicates a major discrepancy between the ICF?s stated plans
          and their implementation. This is illustrated in the table in on p.7 compiled from:

              -- the July 2004 Summary Report on the ICF, prepared by the World Bank, EU, UN and
          IDB which detailed the total needs in each sector and the percentage of funds needed
          in each sector

              -- the figures on actual expenditure of ICF funds released by the Cellule de
          Coordination Strategique, located within the Prime Minister?s Office in Haiti in October
          2005 and updated figures released by the same office in May 2006.

          Economic recovery neglected

          When donors were evaluating what was needed in Haiti in 2004, they identified
          economic recovery as the area which needed most funding. It was assessed as
          needing 38.5% of the total budget. But according to the figures released by the Prime
          Minister's office in May 2006, in practice economic recovery has received the smallest
          share of funding (11.8%) of any of the four strategic axes in the ICF. Economic
          recovery got almost 80% less funding than it was thought to have needed in 2004,
          indicating that donors have made little concerted effort to stimulate economic
          regeneration in Haiti.

          Within the economic recovery axis, every sector received vastly less than the ICF
          donors identified these sectors would need in 2004:

          · environmental protection received 53% less than the already paltry amount originally
          allocated to this line item · agriculture received 74% less · rapid job creation received
          87% less · micro-finance and private sector development received 83% less.

          Given this discrepancy between funds needed and funds disbursed, it is not surprising
          that no targets have been met with regard to job creation and micro-finance, according
          to the Prime Minister's office.

          Over-spend on food aid

          Of the four strategic axes in the ICF, only one has seen an over-spend against the
          budget based on the needs originally identified. This is the access to basic services
          axis, where the over-spend is due to much higher amounts being spent on food security
          and on humanitarian aid. For obvious reasons, it is difficult to accurately anticipate
          humanitarian spending as it depends on the nature and frequency of emergencies that
          arise (tropical storm Jeanne in September 2004, for example).

          Nevertheless, the huge overspend on food security is particularly notable. It was thought
          to need $1.8 million (mainly to set up monitoring systems and to support the National
          Food Security Coordination or Coordination Nationale de Securite Alimentaire -
          CNSP) and ended up receiving over $76 million. This aid was largely from the US and
          arrived in the form of food aid. It is notable that food aid was not included by donors in
          the original ICF resource allocation plans. It has been included in the figures for ICF
          disbursements retrospectively, thereby distorting and inflating the total amount reported
          to have been disbursed through the ICF.

          The ICF and debt payments

          In the table on p. 6, it is worth paying attention to the line item under â??other themes?
          which relates to external arrears clearance. This received 5.8% of ICF funds - a larger
          proportion than was spent on several sectors identified as priorities in the ICF plans
          (security, police and DDR, electricity, job creation, agriculture and roads each received
          a much smaller proportion of funds).

          This expenditure covers overdue debt service. It means that a sizeable proportion of
          donor financing is going towards paying Haiti's arrears, mainly to the World Bank and
          the IDB, rather than towards Haiti's development. It should be remembered that of
          Haiti's total debt burden, between 45 and 49 per cent is estimated to stem from loans
          to the Duvalier family and is classified as odious debt conferred on corrupt leaders. The
          fact that there has been a refusal to address the odious nature of Haiti's debt continues
          to impact on the development potential of the country. Economic regeneration loses out
          while arrears are paid by international donors into donors' accounts.


          The Prime Minister's office in its evaluation report of the ICF in October 2005 stated
          that although there are some achievements, progress can only be classified as minimal
          and positive effects on the quality of life of the population are barely perceptible. The
          bureaucratic procedures which significantly delay disbursements and the lack of
          coordination within the government are key factors behind the lack of progress. But a
          lack of political will to tackle Haiti's huge economic problems has also been a major
          obstacle. The new government clearly recognises that economic recovery has been
          neglected. In June 2006 it announced the creation of a Social Appeasement
          Programme (PAS) for each of the country?s communes (partly funded by the ICF),
          designed to respond to the pressing needs of Haiti?s poorest citizens in the short term.
          We trust this Programme will start to reverse the poor progress of the last two years.

          Recommendations for donors and the Haitian government with regard to
          economic recovery

          In their discussions and agreements with the Haitian government over the use of donor
          funds in Haiti, donors should take heed of the following recommendations:

          · Economic recovery should be the area of focus for future donor engagement, given the
          paltry engagement in Haiti's economic regeneration to date and the amount of
          regeneration needed.

          · Serious investment in a coherent agricultural development policy is needed to raise
          the productivity of small farmers and reduce the alarmingly high levels of poverty in the
          country. Donors must give agriculture one of the highest priorities within economic
          recovery work and critically must actually disburse the funds promised to the sector.

          · A coherent agricultural development policy must be developed. A central element of
          this policy must be the reduction of Haiti's trade deficit and, therefore, its food imports.
          The aim should be to gradually replace imports by promoting national production. Such
          a strategy must be implemented gradually so as not to penalise urban consumers.

          · The agricultural development plan should identify and target particular agricultural
          supply chains - particularly those supplying local markets - and work to build the
          competitiveness and capacity of local producers and businesses.

          · To ensure a pro-poor focus is maintained, one of the key criteria for support should be
          that small farmers and small businesses benefit directly throughout the chain. The
          development of agro-businesses should complement such strategies, not replace them.

          · Training and capacity building of staff in the MANRDR needs to receive greater
          attention. Likewise there needs to be greater investment in training and building the
          capacity of poor agricultural producers at a grassroots level.

          · Given the extent of environmental degradation in Haiti, more investment in
          environmental protection and rehabilitation is needed. A failure to do so could cancel
          out the benefits of other investments in agriculture.

          · The pressing issue of Haitian debt must be addressed. Donors should agree to
          immediately cancel the odious debt portion, to halt debt service payments and to apply
          a moratorium of 10-15 years while a full audit of the remaining debt takes place.

          II Civil society and the Interim Cooperation Framework

          When donors first met in Washington in July 2004 to discuss the International
          Coordination Framework, civil society organizations (CSOs) emphasised to donors the
          absolute necessity of an inclusive process for the development and implementation of
          the ICF. They asserted that this process should be opened up to a wide range of civil
          society actors in Haiti, including the poorest sectors of the population. Haiti's poor, it
          was argued, should be indispensable contributors to national development plans as
          they are the ones who are supposed to benefit most from such plans.

          At first, the ICF process was considered a window of opportunity for the revitalization of
          the political and economic transition in Haiti. Accordingly, several proposals were put
          forward by civil society organizations participating in working groups at the Washington
          conference. The response of those leading the ICF process was that CSOs' proposals
          would be taken into account and that the ICF was to be a 'living document' based on
          inclusive and participatory planning and implementation processes.

          The reality

          Despite these declarations, NGOs participating in COE-H charge that civil society
          participation was very limited during the drafting of the ICF in April and May 2004 and
          has been very limited in the two years during which the ICF has been implemented
          (2004-2006). Indeed the poorest and most marginalized sectors of Haitian civil society
          have been notably absent from any consultation processes. The joint steering
          committee responsible for implementation and follow-up of the ICF (COCCI), for
          example, has failed to engage with civil society organizations at any point.

          In 2005, a group of Haitian non- state actors engaging with the EU over the Cotonou
          Agreement stated that neither the planning, implementation nor the evaluation of the ICF
          had been participatory, as a result of which the ICF was unlikely to fulfill the needs of the
          poorest people in Haiti (namely young people, women, people living in slum areas,
          people working in the agricultural sector, people working in the informal sector and old

          Consultation with the private sector in Haiti, on the other hand, appears to have been
          more extensive. While the private sector is a key player in Haiti's development, donors
          need to recognize that the private sector is not representative of Haiti's diverse civil
          society nor the interests of its poorest citizens.

          The benefits of engagement with civil society

          Past experiences have demonstrated that development initiatives in Haiti are more
          likely to be successful if there is broad participation in the planning and implementation
          of such initiatives. If they had only been given the opportunity to engage with the ICF,
          Haitian CSOs (including COE-H partners) believe that their observations, experience
          and expertise would have enhanced the implementation of the ICF. For example, in the
          view of several Haitian partners of COE-H, international donors have wasted large
          amounts of money on creating an enormous number of different sectoral entities or
          `tables' for implementing the ICF programme. Most of these sectoral tables have not
          functioned very well and the opportunity for using these sectoral tables to harmonise
          sectoral interventions with local priorities has largely been lost. In fact, no individual
          sector alone can solve any of Haiti?s major problems - whether it is environmental
          degradation, unemployment or any other aspect of poverty.

          A genuinely participatory process would have enabled donors, government and CSOs
          to recognize and complement their respective strengths and weaknesses. It could have
          fostered a real tripartite partnership in terms of values and common objectives between
          Haitian civil society actors, the new government and the international community.

          Lack of transparency

          A major obstacle to civil society engagement in the ICF has been the serious lack of
          transparency with regard to both donors? dialogue with Haitian authorities and the
          planning, development, monitoring and evaluation of the ICF.

          This lack of transparency also applies to the preparations for the forthcoming donor
          pledging conference in Port-au-Prince on 25 July in Port-au-Prince. As late as three
          weeks before this conference, COE-H?s Haitian partners reported that they were
          unable to ascertain what arrangements had been made for civil society participation in
          the conference or who would be invited to represent civil society at this event, thereby
          hampering their efforts to develop collective positions for the conference or to input
          meaningfully in its deliberations. Likewise, in the month before the conference,
          members of CoE-H made concerted - and so far fruitless - efforts to establish whether
          or not the audit and independent evaluation of the ICF that donors had committed
          themselves to in February 2006 had actually been carried out, and to discover what
          documents or evaluations will be used as the basis for discussions at the donor
          conference in July.

          Donor plans versus a national development plan

          Following the elections of 2006, the national context in Haiti has changed and the
          population has clearly demonstrated its determination to put an end to the interim
          transition. Haitians now want a new national development plan that reflects the new
          political, economic and social reality of the country and enables them to become actors
          in their own destiny. Donors contributing to the ICF need to recognize this changed
          situation - even if they themselves may have decided to extend the ICF to the end of
          2007. In the view of COE-H member organizations and their Haitian partners, the
          excessive influence of the international community at the expense of a real
          empowerment of the Haitian population in the whole process is no longer acceptable.

          This is all the more pertinent at a time when Haiti is preparing its Poverty Reduction
          Strategy Paper (PRSP). The PRSP will serve as a new framework for donor support,
          including EU support. As has been the case with PRSP processes in other countries,
          the elaboration and implementation of a PRS is supposed to promote national
          ownership and participation. Indeed, donors themselves (including the EU, World Bank
          and IMF) have emphasized that PRSPs should involve a wide range of civil society
          representatives in their planning, implementation and follow-up.

          Consequently, it is now urgent and essential that the Haitian government and donors
          create new and sustainable mechanisms for engaging civil society in the planning,
          follow-up and evaluation of all future development programmes, learning from the
          mistakes of the ICF exercise.


          The massive participation in the presidential elections of 7 February 2006 is a clear
          sign of Haitians' hopes for the future and of their willingness to work jointly with public
          authorities in the formulation of a national consensus on the problems of development
          facing the country. But if they are excluded yet again, this goodwill is likely to evaporate
          and with it all hopes of eliminating poverty and insecurity in Haiti.

          Recommendations for civil society participation in the ICF

          In view of the forthcoming donors meeting on 25 July in Port au Prince, CoE-H member
          organizations ask the European Union and its Members States to consider the following
          recommendations in its dialogue with the Haitian government:

          · Carry out a participatory evaluation of the ICF and publish the conclusions and
          recommendations of this evaluation. Publicly report on the implementation of these

          · Improve the functioning of the joint steering committee for implementation and
          follow-up of the ICF (COCCI) by setting up mechanisms for more inclusive participation
          of civil society organizations.

          · Improve the quality of information circulated to Haitian civil society organizations about
          the progress and implementation of the ICF.

          · Take into account the plans that already exist in Haiti, for example the
          community-based plans in the North East region, and also the approaches already
          developed under the auspices of decentralization.

          · Translate key documents into Creole to enable grassroots organizations and networks
          to input meaningfully into the decision-making process.

          · Implement a public awareness-raising campaign of the ICF and its mechanisms so
          that ordinary Haitians can better understand the programme and its activities.

          · Circulate public information about the PRSP process, including the agenda, the
          framework and methodology proposed, and also the process for approving the national
          budget for implementing the PRS. Take account of CSOs? recommendations for the
          formulation of the PRSP.

          · All efforts on the part of the government and the international community must be made
          with total transparency in order to promote broad engagement and citizens? trust.

          Coordination Europe-Haiti (CoE-H)

          18 July 2006

          Coordination Europe-Haiti (CoE-H)

          Coordinator: Alessandra Spalletta

          Rue des Tanneurs 165,

          B-1000 Bruxelles

          Tél: +32 2 213 04 18 Mob: +32 (0)486 647 612 ;


          1) Coordination Europe-Haiti (CoE-H) is a network of European solidarity and
          non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working directly with Haitian partner
          NGOs and grassroots movements. COE-H incorporates 60 organisations in 8
          European countries: Belgium, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, Germany,
          Ireland, Spain and Switzerland. CoE-H works closely with Coordination
          Haiti-Europe (CoH-E) in Haiti, formed by Haitian NGOs to engage with European
          NGOs and the EU.


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